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•  Overview	of	NASA	and	NASA	Ames	
•  What	is	‘human	factors’?	
•  Applied	examples	of	HF	in	NASA	Ames	
research	
•  Future	HF	research	iniKaKves	
•  Summary:	Why	is	human	factors	important?	
•  Challenges	to	HF	
•  Time	for	quesKons	and	discussion	
Overview	of	NASA	
NASA	Ames	
NASA	Ames:	Human-system		
integraKon	division	
•  Division	dedicated	to	research	focusing	on	
Human-System	integraKon	
•  Human	Factors	is	a	dominant	consideraKon	
•  Human	Factors	research	takes	place	within	
both	aviaKon	and	space	domains	
•  The	following	research	was	all	conducted	
within	the	human-systems	integraKon	division	
at	NASA	Ames	
What	is	human	factors?	
•  “Aims	to	make	technology	work	for	people”-	
Wickens	
•  Incorporates	elements	of	engineering,	psychology,	
cogniKve	sciences	etc.			
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•  Historically,	human	factors	emerged	to	
increase	producKvity	of	employees	
•  Increased	focused	on	human	error	–	sKll	
dominant	today	
•  Research	at	Ames	tends	to	focus	on	the	
human-systems	integraKon	approach	
(prevenKon	vs	retrospecKve)	
•  Appears	to	be	the	most	applicable	approach,	
considering	rapid	increases	in	automaKon	
Human	Factors:		
Applied	examples	from	NASA	
Ames	Research	
Air	traﬃc	control	overview	
•  Manage	sectors	of	airspace	
•  Maintain	safety	
–  Ensure	separaKon	
–  Conﬂict	detecKon	and	
resoluKon	
•  Provide	eﬃcient	user	service	
–  Airlines,	ﬂying	public	
•  Track	aircrac	on	radar	–	
speed,	ﬂight	level,	heading	
(direcKon)		
•  Usually	work	in	teams	
Phases	of	air	traﬃc	control	
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Approach	
•  Use	machine	learning	to	build	a	predictor	of	ATC	
operaKonal	acceptability	for	route	advisories:	
–  Accuracy	of	74%	
•  Relevant	model	features:	
–  Historical	usage	of	route	
–  Timing/locaKon	of	request	in	maneuver	start	sector	
–  Number	of	downstream	sectors	
–  Direct	rouKng	or	via	auxiliary	waypoints	
–  Demand	to	capacity	levels	in	maneuver	start	sector	
•  (Best	performing	model	is	Random	Forest	with	40	
trees)	
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•  Currently,	the	moKon	of	pilot	training	
simulators	is	based	on	opinion	
–  No	standardizaKon	
•  Research	aims	to	develop	a	
standardized	criteria	for	most	realisKc	
simulator	moKon		
•  With	the	wrong	moKon,	pilots	
possibly	learn	to	ﬂy	the	simulator	
instead	of	the	aircrac,	leading	to	pilot	
error	in	hazardous	situaKons	in	ﬂight	
(e.g.	during	a	stall)	
•  The	study	uses	measures	of	pilots’	
performance	and	self-reported	
workload,	as	well	as	moKon	raKngs,	
to	developed	standardized	criteria	
•  Video	
ObjecKve	moKon	criteria	for		
pilot	training	simulators	
Simpliﬁed	pilot	go-around		
criteria		
•  Runway	excursions,	abnormal	runway	contact,	
and	undershoot/overshoot	are	the	third	leading	
category	of	fatal	accidents	in	the	worldwide	
commercial	jet	ﬂeet	
•  The	leading	cause	of	these	type	of	accidents	is	
“go-around	not	conducted”	
–  Most	pilots	are	of	the	opinion	that	current	go-
around	criteria	are	to	complex	and	restricKve	
–  Procedure	problem	or	overesKmaKon	of	abiliKes?	
•  This	project	aims	to	develop	simpliﬁed	universal	
criteria	indicaKng	when	a	go-around	should	be	
performed	
•  Aircrac	dynamics	and	performance	are	important	
to	develop	these	criteria,	as	well	as	workload,	
faKgue,	and	pilots’	percepKon	of	risk	
Human-systems	approach	to		
graceful	degradaKon		
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•  Fault	tolerance	
•  Redundancy	
•  Automa3on	
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•  Airspace	design	
•  Traﬃc	ﬂows	
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e.g.	
•  Training	
•  Human-centered	
interface	design	
•  Decision	support	
tools	
Preven)on	and	mi)ga)on	of	degrada)on:	
•  Preventa3ve	measures	to	generate	graceful	degrada3on	
•  Ac3ve	at	diﬀerent	stages		
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A	noKonal	UTM	world	
•  The	objecKve	of	UTM	is	to	inform	the	needs	and	requirements	for	
enabling	low-alKtude	UAS	operaKons		
–  Services,	roles	&	responsibiliKes,	informaKon	architecture,	data	exchange	
protocols,	socware	funcKons,	infrastructure,	performance	requirements,	
etc.		
•  UTM	=	UAS	traﬃc	
management		
•  UAS	=	unmanned	aircrac	
system		
•  UTM		Concept:	
•  Flexibility	where	
possible	and	structure	
where	necessary	
Examples	of	ObservaKons	to	Guide	
Future	Studies	
Topic	 Comment	volunteered	by	a	par)cipant		
Team	
structure	
Human-in-the-loop	was	a	criKcal	component	of	the	
conformance	alerKng	capability.	CommunicaKon	protocols	
were	established	and	exercised.	This	combined	with	the	
audio	alerts	and	geospaKal	displays	provide	an	eﬀecKve	
alerKng	mechanism	for	all	levels	of	operators	from	the	
mission	director	to	the	pilot.		
Workload	
levels	
permiqng	
message	
handling	
Outside	of	the	test	environment,	during	a	real	lost	link	/	
non-conformance	event,	the	pilot	workload	would	be	too	
great	such	that	the	pilot	may	never	submit	a	message	to	
UTM,	or	the	message	may	be	considerably	delayed.	the	
expectaKon	that	a	pilot	would	message	during	an	
emergency	procedure	is	not	feasible.		
Level	of	
situaKon	
awareness	
The	[interface]	does	not	query	and	visualize	any	associated	
operaKon	volumes,	constraints,	or	other	UTM	aircrac	in	the	
event	of	alerts	or	negaKve	UTM	responses	(e.g.	rejected).	
These	kinds	of	visualizaKons	will	become	increasingly	
important	to	provide	as	much	situaKonal	awareness	as	
possible	to	the	user.		
Note:		although	these	are	quotes	from	single	individuals,	similar	comments	were	gathered	from	mulKple	teams,	which	is	why	this	
topic	has	been	ﬂagged	for	further	invesKgaKon	
HF	note:		Look	how	much	
informaKon	from	how	
many	sources	team	
members	are	having	to	
check	during	a	ﬂight	
HF	note:		Look	at	the	
variability	in	workload	due	
to	the	dynamic	nature	of	
operaKons.		SomeKmes	
responding	to	a	message	
will	be	ﬁne,	but	someKmes	
it	will	be	overload	
HF	note:		Look	that	some	
users	think	they	need	
informaKon	about	other	
ﬂights	–	how	can	this	all	be	
integrated	on	one	display?	
Example	CommunicaKons	Flow	
GCS	=	ground	control	staKon	(home	base)	
VO	=	visual	observer	
UTM	rep	=	UTM	system	operator	
OC	=	observer	controller	
PIC	=	pilot	in	command	
GCSO	=	ground	staKon	operator	
From	an	early	ﬂight	test	study	
HF	considera)ons	at	this	stage	
of	concept	development	
	
•  Team	organizaKon	
•  Team	member	coordinaKon	
•  Team	verbal	communicaKon	
•  Operators	have	diﬀerent	
backgrounds	and	
perspecKves	
•  Messaging	
•  Universal	understanding	of	
short	messages	
•  Workload	levels	permiqng	
message	handling	
•  Level	of	situaKon	awareness	
•  When	is	in-vehicle	
awareness	enough	vs.	SA	of	
local	ﬂying	area?	
•  Procedures	for	emergency	
acKons	
•  Can	universal	procedures	be	
implemented?	
Future	iniKaKves	
•  Urban	air	mobility	
–  Automated	environment	
–  Human	roles	–	monitor	or	operator?	
–  Airspace	design	
–  Tools	design	
•  UTM	
–  Design	of	manager	staKon	
–  Teamwork	
–  CommunicaKon	
–  Role	of	human	
•  TBO	
–  Precision	and	ﬂexibility	in	the	system	
–  Tool	design	
–  FuncKon	allocaKon	-	automaKon	
•  ‘Playbook’	
Challenges	to	HF	
•  Will	HF	sKll	be	relevant	in	the	future	with	
increasing	automaKon?	
•  HF	as	a	barrier	to	implementaKon	
•  Does	HF	idenKfy	problems	and	not	soluKons?	
•  Trouble	with	metrics	related	to	HF	
contribuKon		
Summary:	
Why	is	human	factors	important?	
•  Safety	(e.g.	challenger,	deep	water	horizon)	
•  Eﬃciency	
•  PrevenKon	of	incidents/accidents	
•  SupporKng	human	performance	
•  Guidance	for	usable	and	acceptable	design	
Conclusions	and	future	direcKons	
•  HF	can	enhance	safety	and	eﬃciency	in	safety-
criKcal	systems	
•  It	is	therefore	essenKal	to	consider	HF	in	any	
technological	design	or	development	
•  Human	systems	integraKon	and	Human-
automaKon	teaming	
•  HF	will	sKll	be	needed	and	contribute	to	safety	
and	eﬃciency	in	highly	automated	environments	
•  Need	to	encourage	a	cross	domain	
communicaKon	and	research	to	support	
opKmum	systems	performance	
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